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Recent studies have shown the importance of integrating multisensory information in the
body representation for constituting self-consciousness. However, one idea that has
received only scant attention is that our body representation is also constituted by knowl-
edge of bodily visual characteristics (i.e. ‘what I look like’). Here in two experiments we
used a full body crossmodal congruency task in which visual distractors were presented
on a photograph of the participant, another person, who was either familiar or unfamiliar,
or an object. Results revealed that during the ‘self-condition’ CCEs were enhanced com-
pared to the ‘other condition’. The CCE was similar for unfamiliar and familiar others. CCEs
for the object condition were signiﬁcantly smaller. The results show that presentation of an
irrelevant image of a body affects multimodal processing and that the effect is enhanced
when that image is of the self. The results hold intriguing implications for body represen-
tation in social situations.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
How the brain represents and integrates bodily information from different sensory modalities while taking into account
previous knowledge to give rise to our bodily consciousness is not well understood. The integration of bodily signals such as
touch and proprioception with external information from vision has been studied extensively during the past few years
(Holmes, Sanabria, Calvert, & Spence, 2007; Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2002; Shore, Barnes, & Spence, 2006; Spence et al.,
2004). These investigations were spurred by studies using single cell recordings in animals which revealed neurons that have
receptive ﬁelds that respond to both visual and tactile stimuli (Graziano, Yap, & Gross, 1994; Mountcastle, Lynch, Georgop-
oulos, Sakata, & Acuna, 1975) as well as data from right brain-damaged patients with abnormalities in visuo–tactile integra-
tion (di Pellegrino, Làdavas, & Farné, 1997; Làdavas, Pellegrino, Farnè, & Zeloni, 1998). Subsequent studies suggested that
similar multimodal representations of personal and peripersonal space can also be studied in healthy participants (Lloyd,
Shore, Spence, & Calvert, 2002; Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2000; Spence, Pavani, Maravita, & Holmes, 2004). One well estab-
lished paradigm to quantitatively test such multimodal representations in humans is the crossmodal congruency task
(Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 2003; Spence, Pavani, & Driver, 1998; Spence, Pavani, Maravita, & Holmes, 2004). In the cross-
modal congruency task participants are required to report the location of a tactile stimulation (up or down) while an irrel-
evant visual distractor is ﬂashed at either the same spatial elevation (congruent condition) or the different elevation. All rights reserved.
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(RTs) and/or more errors when the visual and tactile stimuli are incongruent. Furthermore, a larger CCE is observed when
the visual distractor occurs on the same spatial side as the vibrotactile stimulation (e.g. distractor at lower left side, vibration
at upper left side) (Spence, Pavani, & Driver, 2004).
The CCE can be used as a measure of the crossmodal mapping of peripersonal space and to study the extension of
personal space such as during the incorporation of external objects (tools or fake hands) into the body representation
(Spence, Pavani, Maravita, et al., 2004). For example, a CCE (that is generally found between vibrations and light in close
proximity to the participant’s hands) has been shown when the visual distractors were located on rubber hands, but only
when these were placed in a plausible position in relation to the participant’s own hands (Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000;
Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 2010). Similarly, CCEs have been found for distractors placed at the end of elongated tools, but
only after participants had practiced using the tool (Holmes, Calvert, & Spence, 2007; Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver,
2002). This ﬁnding has been interpreted as reﬂecting an extension of peripersonal space to incorporate the tool, compa-
rable to the ﬁnding of an increase in the receptive ﬁeld size of visual–tactile neurons following tool use in monkeys (but
see Holmes, Sanabria, et al. 2007; Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996). In addition, these CCE effects are not limited to the
hands and handheld tools. For example, CCEs were also modulated by visual distractors displayed on the trunk of a body
that was viewed via a video camera from a distance of 2 m and from behind. These CCEs were further modulated by
visuo–tactile stroking, decreased for non-bodily control objects and enhanced when viewing and self-identifying with
the seen human body (Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Palluel, Aspell, & Blanke, 2011). Thus, events occurring in
our extra-personal and peripersonal space may affect the way in which we experience our body. The body representation
seems to be highly malleable (Holmes & Spence, 2004), and under certain conditions it can be extended to include objects
(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Maravita et al., 2002), body parts (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) or even full bodies (Aspell
et al., 2009; Lenggenhager, Mouthon, & Blanke, 2009). Yet despite this ﬂexibility, under normal conditions we rarely
confuse our bodies with other objects or the bodies of others suggesting that the malleability of the body representation
is constrained by additional mechanisms.
An important aspect of maintaining a coherent body representation is our ability to distinguish between what belongs to
our own body proper and what does not (i.e. we take off our hat before combing our hair and we typically do not hesitate to
poke in a ﬁre with a stick, although we would not do such a thing with our ﬁnger) (Boinski, 1988). Several studies have
shown that our proﬁciency in distinguishing ourselves from others relies on the use of visual information, by means of a
comparison between online visual information and pre-existing knowledge of our body’s visual appearance, which we will
refer to here as ‘visual body identity’. This ‘visual body identity’ includes the stored knowledge of our external appearance
that allows one to identify oneself in a photograph. The visual body identity can be considered a perceptual element of the
more general concept of the ‘body image’ which has been deﬁned as the perceptual, conceptual and emotional representa-
tions of the body which are not related to action (de Vignemont, 2010). Many studies have focused on the behavioral and
neural mechanisms underlying the visual recognition of one’s own face (Devue & Bredart, 2011; Dieguez, Scherer, & Blanke,
2011; Kircher et al., 2000; Platek et al., 2006; Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005) and body (Frassinetti,
Ferri, Maini, Benassi, & Gallese, 2011; Frassinetti et al., 2009; Myers & Sowden, 2008; Sugiura et al., 2006). For example, one
study investigated the neural correlates of recognition of the self, a familiar other and a stranger from facial and body movies
and pictures. The results indicated that self-recognition was faster than recognition of a stranger, for both faces and bodies,
regardless of stimulus type (Sugiura et al., 2006). Several other studies have shown an advantage for processing and recog-
nition of the own body (Devue et al., 2007) and body parts (Frassinetti et al., 2009; Salomon, Malach, & Lamy, 2009). Taken
together these ﬁndings show that our own visual body image (face, body or body parts) enjoys privileged processing which is
governed by speciﬁc brain mechanisms. This self-representation may serve to constrain changes in body representation
allowing us to differentiate our body from the environment.
Thus, on the one hand, studies of multisensory integration provide evidence for the ﬂexibility of our body representation,
while on the other hand, other studies show a privileged processing of visual information related to one’s own body, sug-
gesting the involvement of long-term visual knowledge in the body representation. Relatively little is known about how such
body knowledge interacts with the integration of multisensory information related to one’s body. For instance, when we are
combing our hair in front of a mirror we need to integrate visual information about our body with multisensory information
about the relative positions of our body parts. Such a seemingly simple task could easily go wrong, for instance when we are
standing in front of a laughing mirror, causing us to be mistaken about the actual position of our body parts and thereby
underlining the importance of long-term visual knowledge for a coherent body representation.
In the present study, we tested if crossmodal integration (the CCE) was modulated when an image of a body was viewed
and whether this was further modulated by the identity of the body (i.e. whether the body belongs to me or not). Partici-
pants performed a full body crossmodal congruency task in which the visual distractors were superimposed on a picture of
themselves or another person displayed on a large computer screen. We tested if images of the own body induced larger
CCEs than images of another person or of an object. In the ﬁrst experimental condition participants observed their own pic-
ture or that of an unfamiliar other. In the second experimental condition a second group of participants observed their own
picture or that of a familiar person. In this way we controlled for the possible confound that eventual differences in the CCE
are partly driven by familiarity (i.e. own body image is more familiar than the image of a stranger’s body) (Dieguez et al.,
2011) rather than by the identity of the body alone. In an additional experiment we tested whether CCEs would be larger for
bodies then for a body sized object. Based on previous studies showing that the degree of identiﬁcation with an external
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pell et al., 2009; Zopf et al., 2010) (despite controlling for low-level factors such as size, clothing and posture), we expected
higher CCEs in the self-condition compared to the other condition and higher CCE’s when viewing people than when view-
ing an object.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty healthy volunteers (10 females, mean age 22.8 years, s.d. 3 years) participated in the ﬁrst experiment, and another
17 participants (8 females, mean age 22.8 years, SD = 3 years) participated in the second experiment. The studies were ap-
proved by the local ethics committee: La Commission d’ethique de la recherche Clinique de la Faculte de Biologie et de Mede-
cine – at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. All participants gave informed consent and were fully debriefed. After the
experiment the participants ﬁlled out a short questionnaire to assess their identiﬁcation with the pictures shown and to col-
lect some demographic information. All participants had no previous experience with the task, had normal or corrected to
normal vision and had no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions.
2.2. Experimental procedure and apparatus
2.2.1. Experiment1
Participants ﬁrst changed into a white t-shirt and a full body photograph on a ﬁxed background was taken from a dis-
tance of 2 m (Canon PowershotSX200). These photographs were then resized (Adobe Photoshop CS5) to ﬁt a standard
body template so that all bodies were the same size on the screen. For each participant the picture was mirror-reversed,
so that the picture on the screen would be to the same as the participant’s mirror image. The participants were then
ﬁtted with four tactile vibrators each consisting of a small vibrating motor (Precision MicroDrives shaftless vibration
motors, model 312–101, 3 V, 60 mA, 9000 rpm (150 Hz), 5 g). The motors had a surface area (the area touching the skin)
of 113 mm2. These were placed on predeﬁned anatomical locations: left and right shoulder (2 cm under the clavicle), left
and right pelvis (4 cm above the pelvic bone). The participants then placed their right foot on two response pedals (Psy-
chology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA), facing a 50 inch inverted television screen (Samsung N002 HD) placed on the
wall 2 m away (see Fig. 1). The experiment was run using Presentation software (Neurobehavioural systems, Albancy, CA).
During the experiment participants viewed a picture of themselves or a picture of a gender- matched partner, which was
changed every 5 trials. To avoid habituation effects for identity, the two experimental conditions regarding the familiarity
of the other (i.e. familiar and unfamiliar other) were run using separate groups of participants in a mixed within and be-
tween subject design. In the ﬁrst experimental condition participants observed pictures of themselves and of another par-
ticipant that they did not know. In the second experimental condition participants were required to come to the lab
together with a friend they had known for at least 5 months. Accordingly, in the second experimental condition partic-
ipants observed pictures of themselves and of their friend. The rationale for manipulating the familiarity of the other per-
son in the picture was to investigate if eventual differences between the CCE in response to self and other pictures might
be mediated by the familiarity of the picture (i.e. you have more experience with observing your own body than a stran-
ger’s body). In order to avoid strong block-order effects we decided to alternate self and other pictures in mini-blocks of 5
trials.
A central ﬁxation cross was placed in the center of the picture. Four white asterisks serving as visual cues (60  60 pixels)
were presented at locations corresponding to the locations of the tactile stimulators (left and right shoulder, left and right
pelvis). On each trial one of the asterisks changed color to red for three epochs of 50 ms interleaved with three tactile stim-
ulations of 50 ms each (Fig. 1). The locations of the visual and tactile stimulations as well as block order were randomized.
The experiment consisted of 384 trials with 96 repetitions per condition (self/other  congruent/incongruent) The partici-
pants were required to indicate by lifting the foot from the response pedal whether the tactile stimulation was at one of
the top locations (shoulders) or bottom locations (pelvis). Participants were requested to respond as accurately and quickly
as possible.
2.2.2. Experiment 2
In the second experiment, participants saw the visual distractors on a picture of their own body, an unfamiliar other or a
body sized object. The object was a grey rectangle (RGB:187,179,179) with the same size as the body template used in the
other conditions. As in the ﬁrst experiment, a central ﬁxation cross was placed in the horizontal center of the picture. Four
white asterisks serving as visual cues (60  60 pixels) were presented at locations corresponding to the locations of the tac-
tile stimulators. The experiment included 98 trials per condition (self /other/object  congruent/incongruent) with 588 trials
overall. All other parameters were identical to experiment 1. Following the experiment participants were debriefed and
asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire relating to the visual similarity between themselves and the other participant. A subset
of participants from the ﬁrst experiment was also requested to ﬁll in the questionnaire.
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm. Participants stood facing an inverted 50 in. television screen. Tactile stimulators were placed in four standard locations on
the front of the participants’ body. On half of the trials the background picture was a picture of the participant (self condition-panel a) and in the other half
of the trials the picture was of another person (other condition-panel b). On each trial an irrelevant visual distractor light ﬂashed (red asterisk) in one of four
possible locations corresponding to the locations of the tactile stimulators on the participants’ body while simultaneously a tactile stimulation was
delivered to one of the vibrators (shown for illustration purposes as red bolts). Participants had to respond as quickly as possible to the location (up or
down) of the tactile vibration while ignoring the visual distractor. Congruent trials (top panel) are those in which the visual and tactile stimulation were at
same elevation (top/bottom). Example of an incongruent trial is shown in panel b. An additional object condition was included in experiment 2 (panel c).
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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3.1. Experiment 1
Trials in which the participants failed to respond within 1500 ms (less than 1% of trials) and trials with incorrect re-
sponses or trial were discarded from the reaction time analysis. RT outliers (more than 2 STDs from the participant’s mean
RT) were also discarded (less than 5% of trials). Mean accuracy and RTs for all categories are summarized in Table 1. The accu-
racy and reaction time (RT) data were combined to a single measure of ‘Inverse Efﬁciency’ (IE) by dividing the reaction times
by the proportion of correct responses for each participant in each condition. This dependent measure allows us to correct for
any instances of speed-accuracy trade-offs (Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Shore et al., 2006; Spence, Kingstone,
Shore, & Gazzaniga, 2001; Spence, Pavani, Maravita, et al., 2004). The IE data was analyzed using a mixed 4 way ANOVA with
3 within participant factors: identity (self/other), side (same/different) and congruency (congruent/incongruent). A between
participant factor of manipulation examined the effect of the other’s identity (unfamiliar/familiar) which was the single dif-
ference between the two experimental conditions.
In line with our prediction a signiﬁcant interaction between identity and congruency was revealed (F(1,29) = 4.6, p < .05).
Planned comparisons revealed that the CCE was larger when participants viewed their own picture (M = 216) then when
they viewed another person’s picture (M = 179) (t(1,29) = 2.2, p < .05) (see Fig. 2). To further explore the origin of this inter-
action we investigated the mean IEs for self and other by congruency (Fig. 3). This revealed that the interaction was driven by
a large difference in the incongruent condition (self-incongruent – other incongruent = 48 ms) while the difference in the
congruent condition was much smaller (self-congruent – other congruent = 10 ms). Interestingly, this effect was not modi-
ﬁed by the familiarity of the other’s identity as no three way interaction was found between identity, congruency and exper-
imental condition (F(1,29) = 0.4, n.s.).
In addition, the results showed a main effect for identity, (F(1,29) = 18.8, p < .000), with participants being faster to re-
spond to non-self stimuli than to their own picture (Mnon-self = 945; Mself = 974). As expected a main effect of congruency
was found (F(1,29) = 54.9; p < .000), with participants being faster to respond in the congruent condition (M = 861) than
the incongruent condition (M = 1058). A main effect for side was also found with participants responding slower to stimuli
on the same side as the visual distractor (F(1,29) = 6.70, p < .05) (Msame = 973; Mdifferent; = 946). As expected an interaction
between congruency and side was also found, (F(1,29) = 4.99, p < .05), with larger CCEs on the same side (M = 215) than
on different sides (M = 180).
Finally, we tested if the CCE for the non-self-picture (familiar or unfamiliar) was signiﬁcant. The ‘‘other’’ CCE IE (‘other
incongruent’ minus ‘other congruent’) for all participants was used in a single sample t-test. The results clearly showed that
the CCE in the other condition was signiﬁcant (t(29) = 6.3, p < .000 (M = 178)).
3.2. Experiment 2
Two participants were removed from the analysis due to a technical issue during the experiment (a problem with one
tactile vibrator). Data from another participant was not included as he indicated that he was familiar with the unfamiliar
other. Thus in total, data from 14 subjects was analyzed in the second experiment.
The results of experiment 2 were preprocessed as in experiment 1. RT outliers comprised less than 3% of the data. Mean
accuracy for the second experiment was 94.2%. The results were analyzed using 3-way repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors: identity (self/other/object), side (same/different) and congruency (congruent/incongruent) on the IE data.
The results revealed the critical interaction between identity and congruency (F(2,26) = 11.3, p < .001). Planned compar-
isons between CCEs for the identity conditions showed that this was driven by a difference between self (M = 153) and objectTable 1
Reaction time, accuracy and inverse efﬁciency by experiment and condition.
Cong Incong Same side Diff. side Self Other (Stranger) Self Other (Familiar)
Experiment 1
RT (ms) 794 877 840 832 833 828 846 838
STD 136 160 157 151 146 142 164 164
ACC % 92.5 84.3 87.9 88.9 89.6 90.4 85.6 88
STD 4.1 9.1 8.6 7.6 6.6 5.4 10.1 9
IE (ms) 861 1058 973 946 940 922 1009 967
STD 155 255 254 209 209 189 267 253
Cong Incong Same Side Diff. Side Self Other (Stranger) Object
Experiment 2
RT (ms) 723 808 766 764 720 770 806
STD 109 142 136 131 109 134 142
ACC % 97.1 92.9 94.2 95.8 96.9 94.9 93.1
STD 2.8 5.4 4.5 4.9 3 5.1 5.1
IE (ms) 745 873 817 801 743 815 869
STD 116 166 163 151 117 158 167
Fig. 2. Crossmodal congruency effect by identity. Inverse efﬁciency CCE (incongruent–congruent) by identity of background picture: (self/other (unfamiliar)
and (self/other (familiar) experiment 1 and (self/other (unfamiliar)/object) experiment 2. Error bars represents conﬁdence intervals (Loftus & Masson,
1994).
Fig. 3. Inverse efﬁciency by identity and congruency. Mean inverse efﬁciency by identity (self/other) and congruency (congruent/incongruent) in
experiment 1 and (self/other/object) experiment 2. Note similar IEs were found in congruent conditions for both identities in experiment 1. Error bars
represents conﬁdence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).
1360 R. Salomon et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 1355–1364(M = 91) (t = 3.6, p < .01) and between other (M = 141) and object (t = 3.4 p < .01, Bonferroni corrected). A trend for differ-
ences between self and other was also found (t = 2.9 p = .08), with self CCEs being larger than CCEs for others (Fig. 2). A main
effect for congruency was also found (F(1,13) = 45.5 p < .0001) with congruent responses (M = 745) being shorter than incon-
gruent trials (M = 874). The effect of side was also signiﬁcant (F(1,13) = 6.8, p < .05) with same side responses being smaller
(M = 817) than different side responses (M = 802). No other effects reached signiﬁcance (all p > .19). Additionally, we tested if
Fig. 4. Correlation between physical similarity and self CCE bias. The ﬁgure depicts the correlation between subject post hoc self-ratings of physical
similarity with the picture shown in the other condition and the self CCE bias (self CCE-other CCE). Note as the rating of physical similarity increased smaller
differences were found between the self and other conditions (r = .56, p = .0008). The red line plots the linear trend of the data. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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results indicated that the CCE in the object condition was signiﬁcant (t(13) = 6.5, p < .000 (M = 91 SD = 51.9)).
Finally, we requested a subset of the participants from both experiments (N = 28) to rate the level of physical similarity
between themselves and the ‘‘other’’ on a 10-point scale (1 = not similar, 10 = very similar). We performed correlation anal-
ysis between these ratings and the magnitude of the difference between the self CCE and other CCE for each subject. The
result showed a strong negative correlation (r = .56 p = .0008) indicating that the level of perceived physical similarity be-
tween the self and other was related to the amount of interference from the identity of the picture (Fig. 4). That is, partic-
ipants who perceived themself to be more similar to the other had a CCE for the other that was comparable in size to the self
CCE and vice versa. To further test this correlation we divided the subjects in two groups based upon a median split of the
ratings of perceived physical similarity, thus creating a low similarity group (rating 1–5, N = 13) and a high similarity group
(rating 5–10, N = 15). The mean difference between the self CCE and other CCE for the low similarity group was considerably
lower (M = -10.9 SD = 95.3) than in the high similarity group (M = 102 SD = 139.8). A t-test between the scores of the two
groups revealed a signiﬁcant difference (t = 2.36, p < .05).
4. Discussion
In the present study, we investigated if and to what extent crossmodal integration is modulated by the identity of a visu-
ally presented body. At least four main ﬁndings support the notion that visuo–tactile spatial integration is affected by the
presence of the image of a person. First, CCEs were signiﬁcantly higher when the visual distractors were presented on an
image of a body rather than a body sized object. Second, the identity of the seen body also affected visual tactile integration:
visual distractors placed on a self-picture caused more crossmodal interference than distractors placed on a picture of an-
other person, independent of whether the stimuli were applied on the same or on different sides. Third, the perceived level
of physical similarity between the participant and that of the other as judged by the participants correlated with their CCE
scores. Participants who rated themselves as dissimilar to the other person showed smaller CCEs in the other condition com-
pared to the self-condition (Fig. 4). In contrast, participants who rated themselves as similar to the other person showed CCEs
that were comparable in size for self and other pictures. Fourth, the results show that the enhanced crossmodal integration
for self-pictures is not due to the familiarity with the depicted body, as the CCE did not differ when the other’s picture was of
a highly familiar person. Together these ﬁndings show that the identity of a full body representation affects crossmodal inte-
gration as measured by visuo–tactile CCE magnitude.
1362 R. Salomon et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 1355–1364Our results show that the CCE was stronger when the visual distractors were superimposed on bodily compared to non-
bodily objects. This is in line with previous results using human full body crossmodal integration paradigms that showed no
CCE or crossmodal priming effects when the distractor cues were projected on a non-body surface (Aspell et al., 2009; Tho-
mas, Press, & Haggard, 2006). However, the results indicated that the CCE for the object condition was still signiﬁcant. This
effect may be due to the speciﬁc experimental setup in which the background picture was changed every ﬁve trials (unlike
the studies cited above which employed blocks of body vs. object trials). This rapid switching of the background picture may
have caused some residual embodiment with the object due to the highly similar context. Results from several experiments
have shown that the visual characteristics of the real and virtual bodies or body parts need not be identical in order to induce
illusory body ownership (i.e. illusions have been induced with pictures of another person (Ionta et al., 2011) and a gender
mismatched avatar (Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010). Hence, a visual body representation may present a
high level constraint required for induction of changes in bodily consciousness through multisensory integration (Tsakiris
& Haggard, 2005; but see Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). Further experiments manipulating the levels of similarity between
the observed and viewed bodies are required to elucidate the speciﬁc mechanisms by which visual body identity affects
crossmodal integration.
In the present study, it was found that the CCE magnitude was modulated by the identity of the observed person. More
speciﬁcally, a stronger CCE was observed when visual distractors were superimposed on a picture of oneself compared to
another person. This ﬁnding indicates that the ‘visual body identity’ interacts with lower level multi-sensory processes re-
lated to the integration of the visual distractors with the tactile cues. As body size, posture and clothing were controlled it is
likely that identity was most readily discerned from facial cues. Yet, why should the identity of the person depicted in the
photo, used as the background for irrelevant visual distractors have such a strong effect on visual tactile integration? At least
two related interpretations for these ﬁndings are possible: First, it may be that the visual self-image caused the participants
to identify more with the external self-photo than with the other person’s photo: this may in turn facilitate remapping of the
visual and tactile stimulations and thus result in a stronger interference with the tactile discrimination. This explanation is in
line with studies showing enhanced visuo–tactile interactions for felt tactile stimulations paired with the observation of
touch on one’s own compared to another person’s face (Serino, Pizzoferrato, & Ladavas, 2008). Alternatively, the increased
physical compatibility in the self-condition may allow participants to extend or project their body representation to the vi-
sual image of themselves, thereby resulting in a stronger interference from the visual distractors. This interpretation is in line
with previous ﬁndings showing that incorporation of other objects into the multimodal body representation is facilitated by
the congruence between the object and body (Costantini & Haggard, 2007).
We further found that the CCE difference between self and other pictures correlated strongly with the perceived level of
similarity between the self and the other. That is, participants who considered themself to be physically similar to the other
person showed a CCE to both pictures that was comparable in size, whereas participants who perceived themselves to be
dissimilar showed a stronger CCE for self compared to other pictures. The ﬁnding that the CCE is modulated according to
the physical similarity of a body picture to one’s real body provides a further argument for the notion that our visual
body-identity modulates crossmodal integration. We note that the participants in the present study came from a rather
homogenous population, which may have reduced the visual differences between the self and other pictures. Ethnic self-
other differences may further modulate crossmodal integration as shown previously (Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009).
In addition to these main ﬁndings, a few minor issues require discussion. First, the CCE was comparable in size when par-
ticipants observed a body of a familiar and an unfamiliar person. This ﬁnding rules out the possible confound that the stron-
ger CCE observed for pictures of oneself is related to the familiarity of one’s self-representation (i.e. due to more experience
with observing pictures of oneself or looking at oneself in the mirror). Another possible confound is that the self is a more
interesting stimulus than the picture of another person causing participants to pay more attention to the picture during the
self-condition. Yet, our analysis shows that generally the RTs of congruent trials in the self and other condition do not differ
(Fig. 3) suggesting that attention to the self is not responsible for the larger crossmodal interference in the self-condition.
Overall participants responded slower to pictures representing their own body compared to the body of another person.
This ﬁnding is in accord with previous studies showing a preferential processing of self-images compared to other images
(Devue et al., 2007; Frassinetti et al., 2009, 2011; Knoblich & Prinz, 2001; Serino et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2006; Uddin
et al., 2005). Note that whereas most studies - in which the picture was relevant to the subject’s task – have found a decrease
in RT to self-images compared to images of others, the slower responses to self-images found in the present study were ob-
tained in response to task-irrelevant stimuli. Hence enhanced processing of the self-image was associated with longer reac-
tion times for the self-condition.
Studies on the full body illusion induced by synchronous visuo–tactile stimulation have also underlined the importance of
identiﬁcation with the visual body representation for visuo–tactile interactions (Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metz-
inger, & Blanke, 2007). In two studies which measured CCE during the full body illusion a larger CCE was found when par-
ticipants self-identiﬁed with the viewed body as a result of congruent compared to incongruent visuo–tactile stimulation
(Aspell et al., 2009; Palluel et al., 2011). Similar results have also been obtained in a study on the rubber hand illusion, where
self-attribution of the fake rubber hand caused higher CCEs compared to a no illusion condition (Zopf et al., 2010). The pres-
ent study shows that the mere presentation of a human body is already sufﬁcient to facilitate crossmodal integration, even
without inducing a full-body or rubber hand illusion. One possible explanation for this effect may be that because partici-
pants were presented with a front-view of the human with similar visual characteristics (i.e. posture, size, clothing), which
R. Salomon et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 1355–1364 1363may have resulted in a facilitated identiﬁcation with the body in the picture – as if looking in a mirror or facing another
person.5. Conclusions
In conclusion, our data show that low-level processes affect the perception of our body but that this effect is modiﬁed by
high-level representations such as our visual body identity. This interaction between low-level bottom-up multisensory pro-
cesses and high-level top-down visual body representations (see also: Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) may allow us to retain an
intact bodily representation in complex social situations, where we are exposed to conspeciﬁcs with highly similar bodies,
yet distinct visual features. Thus, knowledge of our visual attributes is important to the shaping of our bodily experience in
social situations.Acknowledgments
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